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Abstract
Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching mod-
elling framework for applications within finance, energy markets and other areas, but the difficulty
in solving such problems has hindered their proliferation. Semi-analytical approaches make strong as-
sumptions pertaining very particular cases. To the author’s best knowledge, the only numerical method
in the literature is the heuristic one we put forward in [ABM+19] to solve an underlying system of quasi-
variational inequalities. Focusing on symmetric games, this paper presents a simpler and more efficient
fixed-point policy-iteration-type algorithm which removes the strong dependence on the initial guess
and the relaxation scheme of the previous method. A rigorous convergence analysis is undertaken
with natural assumptions on the players strategies, which admit graph-theoretic interpretations in the
context of weakly chained diagonally dominant matrices. A provably convergent single-player impulse
control solver, often outperforming classical policy iteration, is also provided. The main algorithm is
used to compute with high precision equilibrium payoffs and Nash equilibria of otherwise too chal-
lenging problems, and even some for which results go beyond the scope of all the currently available
theory.
Keywords: Stochastic differential games, nonzero-sum games, impulse control, Nash equi-
librium, quasi-variational inequality, Howard’s algorithm, fixed point policy iteration, weakly
chained diagonally dominant matrix.
Introduction
Stochastic differential games model the interaction between players whose objective functions
depend on the evolution of a certain continuous-time stochastic process. The subclass of impulse
games focuses on the case where the players only act at discrete points in time by shifting the
process. In doing so, each of them incurs into costs and possibly generates ‘gains’ for the others
at the same time. They constitute a generalization of the well-known (single-player) optimal
impulse control problems [ØS09, Chpt.7-10], which have found a wide range of applications in
finance, energy markets and insurance [Bas19, CCTZ06, EH88, Kor99], among plenty of other
fields.
From a deterministic numerical viewpoint, an impulse control problem entails the resolution
of a differential quasi-variational inequality (QVI) to compute the value function and, when
possible, retrieve an optimal strategy. Policy-iteration-type algorithms [AF16, CØS02, CMS07]
undoubtedly occupy an ubiquitous place in this respect, and more so in the infinite horizon
case.
The presence of a second player makes matters much more challenging, as one needs to find
two optimal (or equilibrium) payoffs dependent on one another, and the optimal strategies take
the form of Nash equilibria (NEs). And while impulse controls give a more realistic setting
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than ‘continuous’ controls in applications as the aforementioned ones, they normally lead to
less tractable and very technical models.
It is not surprising then, that the literature in impulse games is limited and mainly focused on
the zero-sum case [Cos13,EAM18,Azi19b]. The more general and flexible nonzero-sum instance
has only recently began to receive more attention. The authors of [ABC+19] consider for the
first time a general two-player game where both participants act through impulse controls,1
and characterize certain type of equilibrium payoffs and NEs via a system of QVIs by means
of a Verification Theorem. Using this result, they manage to provide the first example of
an (almost) fully analytically solvable game, motivated by central banks competition over the
exchange rate. The result is generalized to arbitrary N players in [BCG19], which also gives a
semi-analytical solution (i.e., depending on several parameters found numerically) to a concrete
cash management problem.2 A different, more probabilistic, approach is taken in [FK19] to
find a semi-analytical solution to a strategic pollution control problem and to prove another
Verification Theorem.
The previous examples, and the lack of others,3 give testimony of how difficult it is to
explicitly solve nonzero-sum impulse games. The analytical approaches require an educated
guess to start with and (with the exception of the henceforth referred to as the linear game
in [ABC+19]) several parameters need to be solved for in general from highly-nonlinear systems
of equations coupled with order conditions. All of this can be very difficult, if not prohibitive,
when the structure of the game is not simple enough. Further, all of them (as well as the majority
of the concrete examples in the impulse control literature) assume linear costs. In general, for
nonlinear costs, the state to which each player wants to shift the process when intervening is
not unique, but depends on the starting point. This effectively means that infinite parameters
may need to be solved for, drastically discouraging this methodology.
While the need for numerical schemes able to handle nonzero-sum impulse games is obvious,
unlike in the single-player case, this is an utterly underdeveloped line of research. Focusing on
the purely deterministic approach, solving the system of QVIs derived in [ABC+19] involves
handling coupled free boundary problems, further complicated by the presence of nonlinear,
nonlocal and noncontractive operators. Additionally, solutions will typically be irregular even
in the simplest cases such as the linear game. Moreover, the absence of a viscosity solutions
framework such as that of impulse control [Sey09] means that it is not possible to know whether
the system of QVIs should have a solution or not (not to mention some form of uniqueness)
unless one can explicitly solve it. This is further exacerbated by the fact that even defining
such system requires a priori assumptions on the solution (the unique impulse property). This
is also the case in [FK19].
To the author’s best knowledge, the only numerical method available in the literature is our
algorithm in [ABM+19], which tackles the system of QVIs by sequentially solving single-player
impulse control problems combined with a relaxation scheme. Unfortunately, the choice of the
latter scheme is not obvious in general and it was verified that the convergence of the algorithm
was reliant on a good choice of the initial guess. Additionally, while a numerical validation was
performed, no rigorous convergence analysis was provided at the time.
Restricting attention to the one-dimensional infinite horizon two-player case, this paper puts
the focus on certain nonzero-sum impulse games which display a symmetric structure between
the players. This class is broad enough to include many interesting applications; no less than the
competing central banks problem (whether in its linear form [ABM+19] or others considered in
the single Bank formulation [AF16,CZ99,JP93,MØ98]), the cash management problem [BCG19]
1 [WW17, CWW13] also consider nonzero-sum impulse games but assuming the intervention times of the
players are known from the outset.
2 [BCG19] also studies the mean field limit game.
3 [ABC+19] also gives semi-analytic solutions to modifications of the linear game when changing the payoffs
in a non-symmetric way. To the best of the author’s knowledge, these are the collection of examples available at
the time of writing.
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(reducing its dimension by a simple change of variables) and the generalization of many impulse
control problems to the two-player case.
For this class of games, an iterative algorithm is presented which substantially improves
[ABM+19, Alg.2] by harnessing the symmetry of the problem, removing the strong dependence
on the initial guess and dispensing with the relaxation scheme altogether. The result is a simpler
and more intuitive and efficient routine, for which a convergence analysis is provided. It is shown
that the overall routine admits a representation that strongly resembles, both algorithmically
and in its properties, that of the combined fixed-point policy-iteration methods [HFL12,Cli07],
albeit with nonexpansive operators. Still, a certain contraction property can still be established.
To perform the analysis, we impose assumptions on the discretization scheme used on the
system of QVIs and the discrete admissible strategies. These naturally generalize those of the im-
pulse control case [AF16] and admit graph-theoretic interpretations in terms of weakly chained
diagonally dominant (WCDD) matrices and their matrix sequences counterpart [Azi19a]. We
establish a clear parallel between these discrete type assumptions, the behaviour of the players
and the mimicking of the Verification Theorem.
Section 1 deals with the analytical problem. Starting with an overview of the model (Section
1.1), we recall the Verification Theorem of [ABC+19] and the system of QVIs we want to solve
(Section 1.2). We then give a precise definition of the class of symmetric nonzero-sum impulse
games and establish some preliminary results (Section 1.3).
Section 2 moves on the analogue discrete problem. Section 2.1 specifies a general and
abstract discrete version of the system of QVIs, such that any discretization scheme compliant
with the assumptions to be imposed will be subject to the same results. Section 2.2 presents
the iterative algorithm subject of this paper, and shows how the impulse control problems that
need to be sequentially solved have a unique solution and can be handled by policy iteration.
However, the latter has costly efficiency drawbacks, which is why Section 2.3 provides a general
solver for impulse control problems which outperforms classical policy iteration in many practical
situations. It consists of an instance of fixed-point policy-iteration that is noncompliant with
the standard assumptions [HFL12]. We prove its convergence under our framework.
Section 2.4 characterizes the overall iterative algorithm as a fixed-point policy-iteration-
type method, allowing for reformulations of the original problem and results pertaining the
solutions. (The necessary matrix and graph-theoretic definitions and results needed are col-
lected in Appendix A for the reader’s convenience.) Section 2.5 carries on with the overall
convergence analysis, and shows to which extent different sets of reasonable assumptions are
enough to guarantee convergence to solutions, convergence of strategies and boundedness of it-
erates. A result of theoretical interest, giving sufficient conditions for convergence, is provided.
Discretization schemes within the standing framework are provided in Section 2.6.
Section 3 presents all the numerical results. In Section 3.1, a variety of symmetric nonzero-
sum impulse games, many seemingly too complicated to be handled analytically, are explicitly
solved for equilibrium payoffs and NEs strategies with great precision. This is done on a
fixed grid, while considering different performance metrics and addressing practical matters of
implementation. In the absence of a viscosity solutions framework to establish convergence to
analytical solutions as the grid is refined, Section 3.2 performs a numerical validation using the
only examples of symmetric solvable games in the literature. Section 3.3 addresses the case of
games without NEs. Section 3.4 tackles games such that the results go beyond the scope of
all the currently available theory, displaying discontinuous impulses and very irregular payoffs.
The latter give insight and motivate further research into this field. Lastly, Section 4 concludes.
1 Analytical continuous-space problem
In this section we start by reviewing a general formulation of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games with impulse controls, as considered in [ABC+19], together with the main
3
theoretic result of the authors: a characterization of certain NEs via a deterministic system of
QVIs. The indexes of the players are denoted i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. Since no other type of
games is considered in this paper, we will often speak simply of ‘games’ for brevity. Afterwards
we shall specialize the discussion in the (yet to be specified) symmetric instance.
Throughout the paper, we restrict our attention to the one-dimensional infinite-horizon
case. (A similar review is carried out in [ABM+19, Sect.1].) Some of the most technical details,
concerning the well-posedness of the model, are left out for the sake of briefness and can be
found in [ABC+19, Sect.2].
1.1 General two-player nonzero-sum impulse games
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space under the usual conditions supporting
a standard one-dimensional Wiener process W . We consider two players that observe the
evolution of a state variable X, modifying it when convenient through controls of the form
ui = {(τki , δki )}∞k=1 for i = 1, 2. The stopping times (τki ) are their intervention times and the
Fτki -measurable random variables (δ
k
i ) are their intervention impulses. Given controls (u1, u2)
and a starting point X0− = x ∈ R, we assume X = Xx;u1,u2 has dynamics
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
µ(Xs)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(Xs)dWs +
∑
k: τ1k≤t
δk1 +
∑
k: τk2≤t
δk2 , (1.1.1)
for some given drift and volatility functions µ, σ : R→ R, locally Lipschitz with linear growth.4
Equation (1.1.1) states that X evolves as an Itoˆ diffusion in between the intervention times,
and that each intervention consists in shifting X by applying an impulse. It is assumed that
the players choose their controls by means of threshold-type strategies of the form ϕi = (Ii, δi),
where Ii ⊆ R is a closed set called intervention (or action) region and δi : R→ R is an impulse
function assumed to be continuous. The complement Ci = Ici is called continuation (or waiting)
region. 5 That is, player i intervenes if and only if the state variable reaches her intervention
region, by applying an impulse δi(Xt−) (or equivalently, shifting Xt− to Xt−+δi(Xt−)). Further,
we impose a priori constraints on the impulses: for each x ∈ R there exists a set ∅ 6= Zi(x) ⊆ R
(further specified in Section 1.3) such that δi(x) ∈ Zi(x) if x ∈ Ii.6 We also assume the game
has no end and player 1 has the priority should they both want to intervene at the same time.
(The latter will be excluded later on; see Definition 1.3.1 and the remarks that follow it.)
Given a starting point and a pair strategies, the (expected) payoff of player i is given by
Ji(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds−
∞∑
k=1
e−ρiτ
i
kci
(
X(τ ik)−
, δik
)
+
∞∑
k=1
e−ρiτ
j
kgi
(
X
(τ jk)
− , δ
j
k
) ,
with X = Xx;u1,u2 = Xx;ϕ1,ϕ2 . For player i, ρi > 0 represents her (subjective) discount rate,
fi : R→ R her running payoff, ci : R2 → (0,+∞) her cost of intervention and gi : R2 → R her
gain due to her opponent’s intervention (not necessarily non-negative). The functions fi, ci, gi
are assumed to be continuous.
Throughout the paper, only admissible strategies are considered. Briefly, (ϕ1, ϕ2) is ad-
missible if it gives well-defined payoffs for all x ∈ R, ‖X‖∞ has finite moments and, although
each player can intervene immediately after the other, infinite simultaneous interventions are
precluded.7 As an example, if the running payoffs, costs and gains have polynomial growth, the
‘never intervene strategies’ ϕ1 = ϕ2 = (∅, ∅ ↪→ R) are admissible and the game can be played.
4See [ABC+19, Def.2.2] for a precise recursive definition in terms of the strategies.
5In [ABC+19], strategies are described in terms of continuation regions instead.
6In [ABC+19], Zi(x) is the same for every x ∈ R. The generalization in this paper is a standard one in impulse
control and will prove useful in the sequel. The results in [ABC+19] still hold with the same proofs.
7More precisely, these would be R-admissible strategies. See [ABC+19, Def.2.5] for more details.
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Given a game, we want to know whether it admits some Nash equilibrium and how to
compute it. Recall that a pair of strategies (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for every
admissible (ϕ1, ϕ2),
J1(x;ϕ
∗
1, ϕ
∗
2) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2) and J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ≥ J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ2),
i.e., no player can gain from a unilateral change of strategy. If one such NE exists, we refer to
(V1, V2), with Vi(x) = Ji(x;ϕ
∗
1, ϕ
∗
2), as a pair of equilibrium payoffs.
1.2 General system of quasi-variational inequalities
To present the system of QVIs derived in [ABC+19], we need to define first the intervention
operators. For any V1, V2 : R→ R and x ∈ R, the loss operator of player i is defined as
MiVi(x) := sup
δ∈Zi(x)
{Vi(x+ δ)− ci(x, δ)}.8 (1.2.1)
When applied to an equilibrium payoff, the loss operator Mi gives a recomputed present value
for player i due to the cost of her own intervention. Given the optimality of the NEs, one would
intuitively expect thatMiVi ≤ Vi for equilibrium payoffs and that the equality is attained only
when it is optimal for player i to intervene. Under this logic:
Definition 1.2.1. We say that the pair (V1, V2) has the unique impulse property (UIP) if for
each i = 1, 2 and x ∈ {MiVi = Vi}, there exists a unique impulse, denoted δ∗i (x) = δ∗i (Vi)(x) ∈
Zi(x), that realizes the supremum in (1.2.1).9
If (V1, V2) enjoys the UIP, we define the gain operator of player i as
HiVi(x) := Vi(x+ δ∗j (x)) + gi(x, δ∗j (x)), for x ∈ {MjVj = Vj} (1.2.2)
When applied to equilibrium payoffs, the gain operator Hi gives a recomputed present value for
player i due to her opponent’s intervention.
Finally, let us denote by A the infinitesimal generator of X when uncontrolled, i.e.,
AV (x) := 1
2
σ2(x)V ′′(x) + µ(x)V ′(x),
for any V : R → R which is C2 at some open neighborhood of a given x ∈ R. We assume this
regularity holds whenever we compute AV (x) for some V and x. The following Verification
Theorem, due to [ABC+19, Thm.3.3], states that if a regular enough solution (V1, V2) to a
certain system of QVIs exist, then it must be a pair of equilibrium payoffs, and a corresponding
NE can be retrieved. We state here a simplified version that applies to the one-dimensional
infinite-horizon games at hand.10
Theorem 1.2.2 (General system of QVIs). Given a game as in Section 1.1, let V1, V2 :
R→ R be pair of functions with the UIP, such that for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j:
MjVj − Vj ≤ 0 on R
HiVi − Vi = 0 on {MjVj − Vj = 0} =: I∗j
max
{AVi − ρiVi + fi,MiVi − Vi} = 0 on {MjVj − Vj < 0} =: C∗j (1.2.3)
8Although we could have MiVi(x) = +∞, this will excluded when enforcing the system of QVIs (1.2.3).
9We do not ask for the UIP to hold outside of {MiVi = Vi}, as this is not the case for equilibrium payoffs in
many examples, such as the linear game with constant costs/gains. Proofs in [ABC+19] carry through unaltered.
10Unlike in [ABC+19], there is no terminal condition in the system of QVIs and the assumption that ∂C∗i be
a Lipschitz surface is trivially satisfied for an open C∗i ⊆ R, as it is a countable union of disjoint open intervals.
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and Vi ∈ C2(C∗j \∂C∗i )∩C1(C∗j )∩C(R) has polynomial growth and bounded second derivative on
some reduced neighbourhood of ∂C∗i . Suppose further
(
(I∗i , δ∗i )
)
i=1,2
are admissible strategies.11
Then, (V1, V2) are equilibrium payoffs attained at an NE
(
(I∗i , δ∗i )
)
i=1,2
.
The first equation of system (1.2.3) states that at an equilibrium, a player cannot increase
her own payoff by a unilateral intervention. One therefore expects that the equalityMjVj = Vj
will only hold when player j intervenes, or in other words, when the value she gains can exactly
compensate the cost of her intervention. Consequently, the second equation says that a gain
results from the opponent’s intervention. Finally, the last one, means that when the opponent
does not intervene, each player faces a classical (single-player) impulse control problem.
We conclude this section with some final observations that will be relevant in the sequel:
Remark 1.2.3. Intuitively, one would expect that intervening with a null impulse should be
equivalent to simply not intervening. These notions are indeed the same when interpreted
through system (1.2.3), under our assumption that the cost of intervention is always strictly
positive. If at some state x, MjVj(x) is realized for δ = 0, this means that intervening would
result in a loss: MjVj(x) = Vj(x) + cj(x, 0) < Vj(x), and the player will therefore abstain.
At the same time, allowing for vanishing costs often leads to degenerate games in the current
framework [ABC+19, Sect.4.4]. Hence, assuming cj > 0 is quite reasonable.
Remark 1.2.4. Consider the case of nonegative impulses and cost functions being strictly concave
in the impulse, as in [Cos13]. (Concave costs are also assumed in [EAM18].) That is, ci(x, δ +
δ¯) < ci(x, δ)+ci(x+δ, δ¯) for all x ∈ R, δ, δ¯ ≥ 0. This models the situation in which simultaneous
interventions are more expensive than a single one to the same effect. In such cases, it is easy
to see that in the context of Theorem 1.2.2, player i will only shift the state variable towards
her continuation region.12
1.3 Symmetric two-player nonzero-sum impulse games
We want to focus our study on games which present a certain type of symmetric structure
between the players, generalising the linear game [ABC+19] and the cash management game
[BCG19].13 We shall make a slight abuse of terminology with respect to the more common use
of the term ‘symmetric’ in games theory, but this will be consistent throughout the paper.
Notation. The type of games presented in Section 1.1 are fully defined by setting the drift,
volatility, impulse constraints, discount rates, running payoffs, costs and gains. In other words,
any such game can be represented by a tuple G = (µ, σ,Zi, ρi, fi, ci, gi)i=1,2.
Definitions 1.3.1. We say that a game G = (µ, σ,Zi, ρi, fi, ci, gi)i=1,2 is symmetric (with respect
to zero) if
(S1) µ is odd and σ is even (i.e., µ(x) = −µ(−x) and σ(x) = σ(−x) for all x ∈ R).
(S2) −Z2(−x) = Z1(x) ⊆ [0,+∞) for all x ∈ R and Z1(x) = {0} = Z2(−x) for all x ≥ 0.
(S3) ρ1 = ρ2, f1(x) = f2(−x), c1(x, δ) = c2(−x,−δ) and g1(x,−δ) = g2(−x, δ), for all δ ∈
Z1(x), x ∈ R.
11For consistency with the strategies definition, one should assume that δ∗ has been continuously extended to
R. The conclusion is unaffected by the choice of the extension.
12Let x ∈ I∗i and suppose y∗i := x+δ∗i (x) ∈ I∗i . Set y∗∗i := y∗i +δ∗i (y∗). Then, by the UIP, the definitions of δ∗i (x)
and I∗i , and the concavity of the cost: Vi(y∗∗i )−ci(x, y∗∗i ) < Vi(y∗i )−ci(x, y∗i ) = Vi(y∗∗i )−ci(y∗i , y∗∗i )−ci(x, y∗i ) <
Vi(y
∗∗
i )− ci(x, y∗∗i ), which is a contradiction.
13The latter can be reduced to one dimension with the change of variables x = x1 − x2. Additionally, we will
restrict attention to unidirectional impulses, as these yield the most relevant NE found in [BCG19].
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We say that the game is symmetric with respect to s (for some s ∈ R), if the s-shifted game
(µ(x + s), σ(x + s),Zi(x + s), ρi, fi(x + s), ci(x + s, δ), gi(x + s, δ))i=1,2 is symmetric. We refer
to x = s as a symmetry line of the game.
Condition (S1) is necessary for the state variable to have symmetric dynamics. In particular,
together with (S3), it guarantees symmetry between solutions of the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman
(HJB) equations of the players when there are no interventions, i.e.,
V = V ∗(x) solves AV −ρ1V +f1 = 0 if and only if V = V ∗(−x) solves AV −ρ2V +f2 = 0.
Examples 1.3.2. The most common examples of Itoˆ diffusions satisfying this assumption are the
scaled Brownian motion (symmetric with respect to zero) and the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU)
process (symmetric with respect to its long term mean).
Condition (S3) is self-explanatory, while (S2) is only partly so. Indeed, although symmetric
constraints on the impulses Z1(x) = −Z2(−x) should clearly be a requirement, the rest of
(ii) is in fact motivated by the numerical method to be presented and the type of problems
it can handle. On the one hand, the third equation of the QVIs system (1.2.3) implies that a
stochastic impulse control problem for player i needs to be solved on C∗j . The unidirectional
impulses assumption is a common one for the convergence of policy iteration algorithms in
impulse control.14 However, it is often too restrictive for many interesting applications, such as
when the controller would benefit the most from keeping the state variable within some bounded
interval instead of simply keeping it ‘high’ or ‘low’ (see, e.g., [Bas19] and [AF16, Sect.6.1]).
Interestingly enough, assuming unidirectional impulses turns out to be less restrictive when
there is a second player present, with an opposed objective. Indeed, it is often the case that
each player needs not to intervene in one of the two directions, and can instead rely on her
opponent doing so, while capitalising a gain rather than paying a cost. See examples in Section
3.1 with quadratic and degree four running payoffs.
On the other hand, Z1(x) = {0} = Z2(−x) for all x ≥ 0y means that the intervention
regions of the players do not cross over the symmetry line, i.e., I1 ⊆ (−∞, 0) and I2 ⊆ (0,+∞)
for every pair of strategies. (See Remark 1.2.3.) This assumption guarantees in particular that
the players never want to intervene at the same time (the priority rule can be disregarded).
There are more reasons why the last mentioned condition is less restrictive than it first ap-
pears to be. It is not uncommon to assume connectedness of either intervention or continuation
regions (or other conditions implying them) both in impulse control [Ega08] and nonzero-sum
games [DAFM18, Sect.1.2.1]. The same can be said for assumptions that prevent the play-
ers from intervening in unison [DAFM18, Sect.1.2.1], [Cos13, Rmk.6.5].15 In the context of
symmetric games and payoffs (see Lemma 1.3.7) such assumptions would necessarily imply the
intervention regions need to be on opposed sides of the symmetry line. Additionally, with-
out any further requirements, strategies such that I1 ⊇ (−∞, 0] and I2 ⊇ [0,+∞) would be
inadmissible in the present framework, as per yielding infinite simultaneous impulses.
Definitions 1.3.3. Given a symmetric game, we say that
(
(Ii, δi)
)
i=1,2
are symmetric strategies
(with respect to zero) if I1 = −I2 and δ1(x) = −δ2(−x). Given a symmetric game with respect to
some s ∈ R, we say that((Ii, ξi))i=1,2 are symmetric strategies with respect to s if ((Ii−s, ξi))i=1,2
are symmetric, and we refer to x = s as a symmetry line of the strategies.
Definition 1.3.4. We say that V1, V2 : R→ R are symmetric functions (with respect to zero) if
V1(x) = V2(−x). We say that they are symmetric functions with respect to s (for some s ∈ R)
if V1(x+ s), V2(x+ s) are symmetric, and we refer to x = s as a symmetry line for V1, V2.
14See this assumption in [CMS07, Sect.4] or [ØS09, Sect.10.4.2], its graph theoretic counterpart in [AF16,
Asm.(H2) and Thm.4.3], and a counterexample of convergence in its absence in [AF16, Ex.4.9].
15In [Cos13, Rmk.6.5], assumptions are given to guarantee the zero-sum analogue to MiVi ≤ HiVi, which
slightly strengthened yields a strict inequalities. The latter, in the context of Theorem 1.2.2, imply the equilibrium
intervention regions cannot intersect.
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Remark 1.3.5. Definition 1.3.3 singles out strategies that share the same symmetry line with
the game. For the linear game, for example, the authors find infinitely many NEs [ABC+19,
Prop.4.7], each presenting symmetry with respect to some point s, but only one for s = 0
(hence, symmetric in the sense of Definition 1.3.3). At the same time, the latter is the only one
for which the corresponding equilibrium payoffs V1, V2 have a symmetry line as per Definition
1.3.4. The same is true for the cash management game [BCG19].
Remark 1.3.6. Throughout the paper we will work only with games symmetric with respect
to zero, to simplify the notation. Working with any other symmetry line amounts simply to
shifting the game and results back and forth.
Lemma 1.3.7. For any symmetric game, strategies (ϕ1, ϕ2) and functions V1, V2 : R→ R:
(i) If V1, V2 are symmetric, then M1V1,M2V2 are symmetric.
(ii) If V1, V2 are symmetric and have the UIP, then δ
∗
1(x) = −δ∗2(−x) and H1V1,H2V2 are
symmetric.
(iii) If (ϕ1, ϕ2) are symmetric, then J1(·;ϕ1, ϕ2), J2(·;ϕ1, ϕ2) are symmetric.
(iv) If V1, V2 are as in Theorem 1.2.2 and (ϕ
∗
1, ϕ
∗
2) is the corresponding NE of the theorem,
then (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) are symmetric if and only if V1, V2 are symmetric.
Proof. (i) and (ii) are straightforward from the definitions.
To see (iii), one can check with the recursive definition of the state variable [ABC+19,
Def.2.2], that X−x;ϕ1,ϕ2 has the same law as −Xx;ϕ1,ϕ2 (recall that the continuation regions are
simply disjoint unions of open intervals). Noting also that intervention times and impulses are
nothing but jump times and sizes of X, one concludes that J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) = J2(−x;ϕ1, ϕ2), as
intended.
Finally, (iv) is a consequence of (i), (ii) and (iii).
Convention 1.3.8. In light of Lemma 1.3.7, for any symmetric game we will often lose the
player index from the notations and refer always to quantities corresponding to player 1,16
henceforth addressed simply as ‘the player’. Player 2 shall be referred to as ‘the opponent’.
Statements like ‘V has the UIP’ or ‘V is a symmetric equilibrium payoff’ are understood to
refer to (V (x), V (−x)). Likewise, ‘(I, δ) is admissible’ or ‘(I, δ) is a NE’ refer to the pair
(I, δ(x)), (−I,−δ(−x)).
Due to their general lack of uniqueness, it is customary in game theory to restrict attention to
specific type of NEs, depending on the problem at hand (see for instance [HS88] for a treatment
within the classical theory). Motivated by Lemma 1.3.7 (iii) and (iv), and by Remark 1.3.5,
one can arguably state that symmetric NEs are the most meaningful for symmetric games.
Furthermore, Lemma 1.3.7 implies that for symmetric games, one can considerably reduce the
complexity of the full system of QVIs (1.2.3) provided the conjectured NE (or equivalently, the
pair of payoffs) is symmetric. Using Convention 1.3.8, Theorem 1.2.2 and Lemma 1.3.7 give:
Corollary 1.3.9 (Symmetric system of QVIs). Given a symmetric game as in Definition
1.3.1, let V : R→ R be a function with the UIP, such that:{
HV − V = 0 on − {MV − V = 0} =: −I∗
max
{AV − ρV + f,MV − V } = 0 on − {MV − V < 0} =: −C∗ (1.3.1)
and V ∈ C2(−C∗\∂C∗)∩C1(−C∗)∩C(R) has polynomial growth and bounded second derivative
on some reduced neighbourhood of ∂C∗. Suppose further that (I∗, δ∗) is an admissible strategy.
Then, V is a symmetric equilibrium payoff attained at a symmetric NE (I∗, δ∗).
16Note that g will denote g(x, δ) := g1(x,−δ), as δ ≥ 0 for player 1, yet g1 depends on the (negative) impulse
of player 2.
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Note that system (1.3.1) also omits the equation MV − V ≤ 0 as per being redundant.
Indeed, by Definition 1.3.1 and Remark 1.2.3, the player does not intervene above 0, nor the
opponent below it. Thus, MV − V ≤ max{AV − ρV + f,MV − V } = 0 on −C∗ ⊃ (−∞, 0]
and MV − V < 0 on [0,+∞).
System (1.3.1) significantly simplifies a numerical problem which is very challenging even
in cases of linear structure [ABM+19]. In light of the previous, we will focus our attention on
symmetric NEs only and numerically solving the reduced system of QVIs (1.3.1).
2 Numerical discrete-space problem
In this section we consider a discrete version of the symmetric system of QVIs (1.3.1) over
a fixed grid, and propose and study an iterative method to solve it. As it is often done in
numerical analysis for stochastic control, for the sake of generality we proceed first in an abstract
fashion without making reference to any particular discretization scheme. Instead, we give some
general assumptions any such scheme should satisfy for the results presented to hold. Explicit
discretization schemes within our framework are presented in Section 2.6 and used in Section 3.
2.1 Discrete system of quasi-variational inequalities
From now on we work on a discrete symmetric grid
G : x−N = −xN < · · · < x−1 = −x1 < x0 = 0 < x1 < · · · < xN .
RG denotes the set of functions v : G → R and S : RG → RG denotes the symmetry operator,
Sv(x) = v(−x). In general, by an ‘operator’ we simply mean some F : RG → RG, not necessarily
linear nor affine unless explicitly stated. We shall identify grid points with indexes, functions
in RG with vectors and linear operators with matrices; e.g., S = (Sij) with Sij = 1 if xi = −xj
and 0 otherwise. The (partial) order considered in RG and RG×G is the usual pointwise order
for functions (elementwise for vectors and matrices), and the same is true for the supremum,
maximum and arg-maximum induced by it.
We want to solve the following discrete nonlinear system of QVIs for v ∈ RG:{
Hv − v = 0 on − {Mv − v = 0} =: −I∗
max
{
Lv + f,Mv − v} = 0 on − {Mv − v < 0} =: −C∗, (2.1.1)
where f ∈ RG and L : RG → RG is a linear operator. The nonlinear operators M,H : RG → RG
are as follows: let ∅ 6= Z(x) ⊆ R be a finite set for each x ∈ G, with Z(x) = {0} if x ≥ 0. Set
Z :=
∏
x∈G Z(x) and for each δ ∈ Z let B(δ) : RG → RG be a linear operator, c(δ) ∈ (0,+∞)G
and g(δ) ∈ RG, the three of them being row-decoupled (i.e., row x of B(δ), c(δ), g(δ) depends
only on δ(x) ∈ Z(x)). Then
Mv := max
δ∈Z
{
B(δ)v − c(δ)}, Hv = H(δ∗)v := SB(δ∗)Sv + g(Sδ∗) (2.1.2)
and δ∗ = δ∗(v) := max
(
arg max
δ∈Z
{
B(δ)v − c(δ)}). (2.1.3)
Some remarks are in order. Firstly, in the same fashion as the continuous-space case, the sets
I∗, C∗ form a partition of the grid and represent the (discrete) intervention and continuation
regions of the player, while −I∗,−C∗ are such regions for the opponent.
Secondly, the general representation of M follows [CMS07,AF16]. For the standard choices
of B(δ), our definition of H is the only one for which a discrete version of Lemma 1.3.7 holds
true (see Section 2.6). However, since B and g are row-decoupled, SB(δ∗)S and g(Sδ∗) cannot
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be, as each row x depends on δ∗(−x). For this reason and the lack of maximization over −I∗,
there is no obvious way to reduce problem (2.1.1) to a classical Bellman problem:
sup
ϕ
{−A(ϕ)v + b(ϕ)} = 0, (2.1.4)
like in the impulse control case [AF16], to apply Howard’s policy iteration [BMZ09, Ho-1].
Furthermore, unlike in the control case, even with unidirectional impulses and good properties
for L and B(δ), system (2.1.1) may have no solution as in the analytical case [ABC+19].
Thirdly, we have defined δ∗ in (2.1.3) by choosing one particular maximizing impulse for
each x ∈ G. The main motivation behind fixing one is to have a well defined discrete system of
QVIs for every v ∈ RG. (This is not the case for the analytical problem (1.3.1) where the gain
operator H is not well defined unless V has the UIP.) Being able to plug in any v in (2.1.1)
and obtain a residual will be useful in practice, when assessing the convergence of the algorithm
(see Section 3). Whether a numerical solution verifies, at least approximately, a discrete UIP
(and the remaining technical conditions of the Verification Theorem) becomes something to be
checked separately.
Remark 2.1.1. Choosing the maximum arg-maximum in (2.1.3) is partly motivated by ensuring
a discrete solution will inherit the property of Remark 1.2.4. (The proof remains the same, for
the discretizations of Section 2.6.) We will also motivate it in terms of the proposed numerical
algorithm in Remark 2.6.4. Note that in [ABM+19] the minimum arg-maximum is used instead
for both players. Nevertheless, the replication of property (ii), Lemma 1.3.7, dictates that it
is only possible to be consistent with [ABM+19] for one of the two players (in this case, the
opponent).
2.2 Iterative algorithm for symmetric games
This section introduces the iterative algorithm developed to solve system (2.1.1), which builds
on [ABM+19, Alg.2] by harnessing the symmetry of the problem and dispenses with the need for
a relaxation scheme altogether. It is presented with a pseudocode that highlights the mimicking
of system (2.1.1) and the intuition behind the algorithm; namely:
• The player starts with some suboptimal strategy ϕ0 = (I0, δ0) and payoff v0, to which
the opponent responds symmetrically, resulting in a gain for the player (first equation of
(2.1.1); lines 1, 2 and 4 of Algorithm 2.2.1).
• The player improves her strategy by choosing the optimal response, i.e., by solving a
single-player impulse control problem through a policy-iteration-type algorithm (second
equation of (2.1.1); line 5 of Algorithm 2.2.1).
• This procedure is iterated until reaching a stopping criteria (lines 6-8 of Algorithm 2.2.1).
Notation 2.2.1. In the following: G<0 and G≤0 represent the sets of grid points which are
negative and nonpositive respectively, and Φ the set of (discrete) strategies
Φ := {ϕ = (I, δ) : I ⊆ G<0 and δ ∈ Z}. (2.2.1)
Set complements are taken with respect to the whole grid, Id : RG → RG is the identity
operator; and given a linear operator O : RG → RG ' RG×G, v ∈ RG and subsets I, J ⊆ G,
vI ∈ RI denotes the restriction of v to I and OIJ ∈ RI×J the submatrix/operator with rows in
I and columns in J .
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Algorithm 2.2.1 Iterative algorithm for symmetric games
Set tol, scale > 0.
1: Choose initial guess: v0 ∈ RG.
2: Set I0 = {Lv0 + f ≤Mv0 − v0} ∩G<0 and δ0 = δ∗(v0).
3: for k = 0, 1, . . . do
4: vk+1/2 =
{
H(δk)vk on − Ik
vk on (−Ik)c
5: (vk+1, Ik+1, δk+1) = SolveImpulseControl(vk+1/2, (−Ik)c)
6: if ‖(vk+1 − vk)/max{|vk+1|, scale}‖∞ < tol then
7: break from the iteration
8: end if
9: end for
The scale parameter in line 5 of Algorithm 2.2.1, used throughout the literature by Forsyth,
Labahn and coauthors [AF16, FL07, HFL12, HFL13], prevents the enforcement of unrealistic
levels of accuracy for points x where vk+1(x) ≈ 0. Additionally, note that having chosen the
initial guess for the payoff v0, the initial guess for the strategy is taken as the one induced by
v0.
Line 5 of Algorithm 2.2.1 assumes we have a subroutine SolveImpulseControl(w,D)
that solves the constrained QVI problem:
max{Lv + f,Mv − v} = 0 on D, subject to v = w on Dc (2.2.2)
for fixed G≤0 ⊆ D ⊆ G (approximate continuation region of the opponent) and w ∈ RG
(approximate payoff due to the opponent’s intervention). Although we only need to solve for
v˜ = vD, the value of vDc = wDc impacts the solution both when restricting the equations
and when applying the nonlocal operator M . Hence, the approximate payoff vk+1/2 fed to the
subroutine serves to pass on the gain that resulted from the opponent’s intervention and as an
initial guess if desired (more on this on Remark 2.3.3).
The remaining of this section consists in establishing an equivalence between problem (2.2.2)
and a classical (unconstrained) QVI problem of impulse control, and showing that SolveIm-
pulseControl can be defined, if wanted, by policy iteration. However, we will see in the next
section a variant that performs better in many practical situations and, in particular, in the
examples treated in Section 3. Let us suppose from here onwards that the following assumptions
hold true (see Appendix A for the relevant Definitions A.1.1):
(A0) For each strategy ϕ = (I, δ) ∈ Φ and x ∈ I, there exists a walk in graphB(δ) from row x
to some row y ∈ Ic.
(A1) −L is a strictly diagonally dominant (SDD) L0-matrix and, for each δ ∈ Z, Id− B(δ) is
a weakly diagonally dominant (WDD) L0-matrix.
Remark 2.2.2 (Interpretation). Assumptions (A0),(A1) are (H2),(H3) in [AF16]. For an impulse
operator (say, ‘B(δ)v(x) = v(x+ δ)’), (A0) asserts that the player always wants to shift states
in her intervention region to her continuation region through finitely many impulses. (This
does not take into account the opponent’s response.) On the other hand, if problem (2.2.2) was
rewritten as a fixed point problem, (A2) would essentially mean that the uncontrolled operator
is contractive while the controlled ones are nonexpansive (see [CMS07] and [AF16, Sect.4]).
Theorem 2.2.3. Assume (A0),(A1). Then, for every G≤0 ⊆ D ⊆ G and w ∈ RG, there exists
a unique v∗ ∈ RG that solves the constrained QVI problem (2.2.2). Further, v∗D is the unique
solution of
max
{
L˜v˜ + f˜ , M˜ v˜ − v˜
}
= 0, (2.2.3)
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where L˜ := LDD, f˜ := fD+LDDcwDc , Z˜ :=
∏
x∈D Z(x), c˜(δ˜) := c(δ˜)−B(δ˜)DDcwDc and B˜(δ˜) :=
B(δ˜)DD for δ˜ ∈ Z˜; and M˜v˜ := maxδ˜∈Z˜
{
B˜(δ˜)v˜ − c˜(δ˜)} for v˜ ∈ RD.
Additionally, for any initial guess, the sequence (v˜k) ⊆ RD defined by policy iteration [AF16,
Thm.4.3] applied to problem (2.2.3), converges exactly to v∗ in at most |Φ˜| iterations, with
Φ˜ := {ϕ˜ = (I, δ˜) : I ⊆ G<0 and δ˜ ∈ Z˜} the set of restricted admissible strategies.17
Proof. The equivalence between problems (2.2.2) and (2.2.3) is due to simple algebraic manip-
ulation and B(δ), c(δ) being row-decoupled for every δ ∈ Z. (B(δ˜), c(δ˜) are thus defined in the
obvious way for each δ˜ ∈ Z˜.)
The rest of the proof is mostly as in [AF16, Thm.4.3]. Let I˜d = IdDD. Each intervention
region I, can be identified with its indicator ψ˜ = 1I ∈ {0, 1}D since D ⊇ I, and each ψ˜ can
be identified in turn with a diagonal matrix having ψ˜ as main diagonal: Ψ˜ = diag(ψ˜) ∈ RD×D.
Then problem (2.2.3) takes the form of the classical Bellman problem
max
ϕ˜∈Φ˜
{−A(ϕ˜)v + b(ϕ˜)} = 0, (2.2.4)
if we take
A(ϕ˜) = −(I˜d− Ψ˜)L˜+ Ψ˜(I˜d− B˜(δ˜)) and b(ϕ˜) = (I˜d− Ψ˜)f˜ − Ψ˜c˜.
Note that Φ˜ can be identified with the Cartesian product
Φ˜ =
( ∏
x∈G<0
{0, 1} × Z(x)
)
×
( ∏
x∈D\G<0
{0} × Z(x)
)
and A(ϕ˜), b(ϕ) are row-decoupled for every ϕ ∈ Φ˜. Since Φ˜ is finite, all we need to show is that
the matrices A(ϕ˜) are monotone (Definitions A.1.1 and [BMZ09, Thm.2.1]). Let us check the
stronger property (Thm. A.1.4 and Prop. A.1.3) of being weakly chained diagonally dominant
(WCDD) L0-matrices (see Definitions A.1.1).
If (A0) and (A1) also held true for the restricted matrices and strategies (A(·), Φ˜), the
conclusion would follow. While (A1) is clearly inherited, (A0) may fail to do so, but only in
non-problematic cases. To see this, let ϕ˜ = (I, δ˜) ∈ Φ˜, x ∈ I ⊆ D and δ ∈ Z, some extension of
δ˜. Note that row x of A(ϕ˜) is WDD. We want to show that there is a walk in graphA(ϕ˜) from
x to an SDD row.
By (A0) there must exist some walk x → y1 → · · · → yn ∈ Ic in graphB(δ). If this is
in fact a walk from x to Ic ∩ D in graphB˜(δ˜), then it verifies the desired property (just as
in [AF16, Thm.4.3]). If not, then there must be a first 1 ≤ m ≤ n such that the subwalk
x→ y1 → · · · → ym is in graphB˜(δ˜) but ym+1 /∈ D. Since ym → ym+1 is an edge in graphB(δ),
we have B(δ)ym,ym+1 6= 0 and the WDD row (by (A1)) ym of I˜d− B˜(δ˜) is in fact SDD. Meaning
that the subwalk x→ y1 → · · · → ym verifies the desired property instead.
Remark 2.2.4. (Practical considerations) 1. While convergence is guaranteed to be exact, float-
ing point arithmetic can bring about stagnation [HFL13]. A stopping criteria like that of Al-
gorithm 2.2.1 should be used in those cases, with a tolerance  tol. 2. The solution of system
(2.2.3) does not change if one introduces a scaling factor λ > 0: max
{
L˜v˜ + f˜ , λ
(
M˜v˜ − v˜)} = 0
[AF16, Lem.4.1]. This problem-specific parameter is typically added in the implementation to
enhance performance [HFL12,AF16]. It can intuitively be thought as a units adjustment.
17|A| denotes the cardinal of set A.
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2.3 Iterative subroutine for impulse control
Due to Theorem 2.2.3 and Remark 2.2.4 2, a sensible choice for SolveImpulseControl is
the classical policy iteration algorithm [AF16, Thm.4.3] applied to (2.2.3) (i.e., [BMZ09, Ho-
1] applied to (2.2.4)), adding an appropriately chosen scaling factor λ to improve efficiency
(Remark 2.2.4). It does, however, bear some drawbacks in practice. At each iteration, one needs
to solve the system −A(ϕ˜k)vk+1 + b(ϕ˜k) = 0 for some ϕ˜k ∈ Φ˜. While the matrix L˜ typically
has a good sparsity pattern in applications (often tridiagonal), the presence of B˜(δ˜k) prevents
A(ϕ˜k) from inheriting the same structure and makes the resolution of the previous system a
lot more costly, even when using a good ordering technique. An exact resolution often becomes
prohibitive and an iterative method, such as GMRES or BiCGSTAB with preconditioning, is
relied upon.
To circumvent the previous problem, we propose to choose SolveImpulseControl as an
instance of a very general class of algorithms known as fixed-point policy iteration [HFL12,Cli07].
Instead of solving −A(ϕ˜k)vk+1 + b(ϕ˜k) = 0 at iteration k, we will solve(
(I˜d− Ψ˜k)L˜− Ψ˜k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−A˜(ϕ˜k)
vk+1 + Ψ˜kB˜(δ˜k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B˜(ϕ˜k)
vk + b(ϕ˜k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C˜(ϕ˜k)
= 0, (2.3.1)
(scaled by λ) where the previous iterate value vk is given and Ψ˜k is the diagonal matrix with
ψk as diagonal. In other words, we split the original policy matrix A(ϕ˜) = A˜(ϕ˜)− B˜(ϕ˜) and we
apply a one-step fixed-point approximation,
A˜
(
ϕ˜k
)
v˜k+1 = B˜
(
ϕ˜k
)
v˜k + C˜
(
ϕ˜k
)
, (2.3.2)
at each iteration of Howard’s algorithm. The resulting method can be expressed as follows (tol
and scale are as in Algorithm 2.2.1):
Subroutine 2.3.1 (v, I, δ) = SolveImpulseControl(w,D)
Inputs w ∈ RG and solvency region G≤0 ⊆ D ⊆ G
Outputs v ∈ RG, I ⊆ G<0, δ ∈ Z
Set scaling factor λ > 0 and 0 < t˜ol tol.
// Restrict constrained problem
1: L˜ := LDD, f˜ := fD + LDDcwDc
2: Z˜ :=
∏
x∈D Z(x), c˜(δ˜) := c(δ˜)−B(δ˜)DDcwDc , B˜(δ˜) := B(δ˜)DD for δ˜ ∈ Z˜
3: M˜v˜ := maxδ˜∈Z˜
{
B˜(δ˜)v˜ − c˜(δ˜)} for v˜ ∈ RD, I˜d := IdDD
// Solve restricted problem
4: Choose initial guess: v˜0 ∈ RD, I0 ⊆ G<0
5: for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
6: L˜kij =
{
L˜ij if xi ∈ D\Ik
−I˜dij if xi ∈ Ik
f˜k =
{
f˜ on ∈ D\Ik
M˜v˜k on Ik
7: v˜k+1 solution of L˜kv˜ + f˜k = 0
8: Ik+1 =
{
L˜v˜k+1 + f˜ ≤ λ(M˜v˜k+1 − v˜k+1)}
9: if ‖(v˜k+1 − v˜k)/max{v˜k+1, scale}‖∞ < t˜ol then
10: v =
{
v˜k+1 on D
wDc on D
c
, I = Ik+1, δ = δ∗(v) and break from the iteration
11: end if
12: end for
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Lines 1-3 of Subroutine 2.3.1 deal with restricting the constrained problem, while the rest
give a routine that can be applied to any QVI of the form (2.2.3). Starting from some suboptimal
v˜0 and I0, one computes a new payoff v˜1 by solving the coupled equations M˜v˜0 − v˜1 = 0 on I0
and L˜v˜1 + f˜ = 0 outside of I0. A new intervention region I1 =
{
L˜v˜1 + f˜ ≤ λ(M˜v˜1 − v˜1)} is
defined and the procedure is iterated. (Note that this alternative expression for the intervention
region will give the same as
{
M˜v˜1 − v˜1 = 0} for the solution of (2.2.3).)
Algorithmically, the difference with classical policy iteration is that v˜k+1 is computed in
Line 8 with a fixed obstacle M˜vk, changing a quasivariational inequality for a variational one.
The resulting method is intuitive and simple to implement, and the linear system (2.3.1) (Line
8) inherits the sparsity pattern of L˜. This will normally result in more precision and lower space
and time complexity.18 For example, for an SDD tridiagonal L˜, the system can be solved (exactly
in exact arithmetic, and stably in floating point one) in O(n) operations, with n = |D| [Hig02,
Sect.9.5]. The matrix-vector multiply B˜(δ˜k)v˜k can take at most O(n2) operations, but will
reduce to O(n) for standard discretizations of impulse operators.
It is also worth mentioning that Subroutine 2.3.1 differs from the so-called iterated optimal
stopping [CØS02, ØS09] in that the latter solves max
{
L˜v˜k+1 + f˜ , M˜ v˜k − v˜k+1} = 0 exactly
at the k-th iteration (by running a full subroutine of Howard’s algorithm with fixed obstacle),
while the former only performs one approximation step.
To establish the convergence of Subroutine 2.3.1 in the present framework, we add the
following assumption:
(A2) B(δ) has nonnegative diagonal elements for all δ ∈ Z.
Remark 2.3.1. (A2) and the requirement of (A1) that Id − B(δ) be a WDD L0-matrix are
equivalent to B(δ) being substochastic (see Appendix A). This is standard for impulse operators
(see Section 2.6) and other applications of fixed-point policy iteration [HFL12, Sect.4-5].
Theorem 2.3.2. Assume (A0)–(A2) and set I0 = ∅. Then, for every G≤0 ⊆ D ⊆ G and
w ∈ RG, the sequence (v˜k) defined by SolveImpulseControl(w,D) is monotone increasing
for k ≥ 1 and converges to the unique solution of (2.2.3).
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that λ = 1. Subroutine 2.3.1 takes the form of
a fixed-point policy iteration algorithm as per (2.3.2). Assumptions (A0),(A1) ensure (2.2.3) has
a unique solution (Theorem 2.3.1) and that this scheme satisfies [HFL12, Cond.3.1 (i),(ii)]. That
is, A˜(ϕ˜) and A˜(ϕ˜)−B˜(ϕ˜) are nonsingular M -matrices (see proof of Theorem 2.3.1 and Appendix
A) and all coefficients are bounded since Φ˜ is finite. In [HFL12, Thm.3.4] convergence is proved
under one additional assumption of ‖ · ‖∞-contractiveness [HFL12, Cond.3.1 (iii)], which is not
verified in our case. However, the same computations show that the scheme satisfies
A˜(ϕ˜k)(v˜k+1 − v˜k) ≥ B˜(ϕ˜k−1)(v˜k − v˜k−1) for all k ≥ 1. (2.3.3)
Since I0 = ∅, and due to (A1) and (A2), B˜(ϕ˜0) = 0 and B˜(ϕ˜k) ≥ 0 for all k. Thus, (v˜k)k≥1 is
increasing by monotonicity of A˜(ϕ˜k). Furthermore, it must be bounded, since for all k ≥ 1:
A˜
(
ϕ˜k
)
v˜k+1 = B˜
(
ϕ˜k
)
v˜k + C˜
(
ϕ˜k
) ≤ B˜(ϕ˜k)v˜k+1 + C˜(ϕ˜k),
which gives v˜k+1 ≤ (A˜(ϕ˜k) − B˜(ϕ˜k))−1C˜(ϕ˜k) ≤ maxϕ˜∈Φ˜(A˜(ϕ˜) − B˜(ϕ˜))−1C˜(ϕ˜). Hence, (v˜k)
converges.
Remark 2.3.3. In light of Theorem 2.3.2 we will set I0 = ∅moving forward. It is natural however
to choose v˜0 = wD and I
0 =
{
L˜v˜0 + f˜ ≤ λ(M˜v˜0 − v˜0)}. The experiments performed displayed
(non-monotone) convergence and usually a faster one; but this is not proved here. Additionally,
exact convergence was often observed.
18This refers to the overall time complexity of Subroutine 2.3.1, including the linear solves, and not just the
number of outer loops.
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2.4 Overall algorithm as a fixed-point policy-iteration-type method
The QVIs system (2.1.1) cannot be reduced in any apparent way to a Bellman formulation
(2.1.4) (see comments preceding equation). Notwithstanding, we shall see that Algorithm 2.2.1
does take a very similar form to a fixed-point policy iteration algorithm as in (2.3.2) for some
appropriate A,B,C. Further, assumptions resembling those of the classical case [HFL12] will be
either satisfied or imposed to study its convergence. This is independent of whether SolveIm-
pulseControl is chosen as in Subroutine 2.3.1 or Howard’s algorithmas in Theorem 2.2.3,
although we shall assume that the output Ik, δk in the latter case are defined in the same way
as in the former. The matrix and graph theoretic definitions and properties used throughout
this section can be found in Appendix A.
Notation 2.4.1. We identify each intervention region I ⊆ G<0 with its indicator function ψ =
1I ∈ {0, 1}G and each ψ with a diagonal matrix having ψ as main diagonal: Ψ = diag(ψ) ∈
RG×G. The sequences (vk) and (ϕk), with ϕk = (ψk, δk), are the ones generated by Algorithm
2.2.1. We consider v∗ ∈ RG fixed and ϕ∗ = (ψ∗, δ∗(v∗)) the induced strategy with ψ∗ :=
{Lv∗ + f ≤Mv∗ − v∗} ∩G<0.
Proposition 2.4.2. Assume (A0)–(A2). Then,
A
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
vk+1 = B
(
ϕk
)
vk + C
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
, where: (2.4.1)
(i) ψk = 1{Lvk+f≤Mvk−vk}∩G<0 and δ
k ∈ arg maxδ∈Z
{
B(δ)vk − c(δ)}.
(ii) A
(
ϕ,ϕ
)
:= Id − (Id − Ψ − SΨS)(Id + L) − ΨB(δ) is a WCDD L0-matrix, and thus a
nonsingular M-matrix.
(iii) B
(
ϕ
)
:= SΨB(δ)S = diag(Sψ)SB(δ)S is substochastic.
(iv) C
(
ϕ,ϕ
)
:=
(
Id−Ψ− SΨS)f −Ψc(δ) + SΨSg(Sδ).
Proof. Using that (vk+1, Ik+1, δk+1) = SolveImpulseControl(vk+1/2, (−Ik)c) solves the con-
strained QVI problem (2.2.2) for D = (−Ik)c and w = vk+1/2 (Theorem 2.2.3 or 2.3.2), the
recurrence relation (2.4.1) results from simple algebraic manipulation.
Given ϕ,ϕ ∈ Φ, (A0) and (A1) ensure A(ϕ,ϕ) is a WCDD L0-matrix, while (A1) and (A2)
imply B
(
ϕ
)
is substochastic.
The following corollary is immediate by induction. It gives a representation of the sequence
of payoffs in terms of the improving strategies throughout the algorithm.
Corollary 2.4.3. Assume (A0)–(A2). Then,
vk+1 =
 0∏
j=k
A−1B
(
ϕj , ϕj+1
) v0 + k∑
n=0
n+1∏
j=k
A−1B
(
ϕj , ϕj+1
)A−1C(ϕn, ϕn+1).19 (2.4.2)
We now establish some properties of the strategy-dependent matrix coefficients that will be
useful in the sequel. Given a WDD (resp. substochastic) matrix A ∈ RG×G, we define its set of
‘non-trouble states’ (or rows) as
J [A] := {x ∈ G : row x of A is SDD} (resp. Jˆ [A] := {x ∈ G : row x of A sums less than one}),
and its index of connectivity conA (resp. index of contraction ĉonA) by computing for each state
the least length that needs to be walked on graphA to reach a non-trouble one, and then taking
the maximum over all states (more details in Appendix A). This recently introduced concept
19For any index i ≤ k, ∏ij=k Aj := AkAk−1 . . . Ai.
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gives an equivalent charaterization of the WCDD property for a WDD matrix as conA < +∞,
and can be efficiently checked for sparse matrices in O(|G|) operations [Azi19a]. On the other
hand, if A is substochastic then ĉonA < ∞ if and only if its spectral radius verifies ρ(A) < 1
(Theorem A.1.6). The proof of the following lemma can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.4.4. Assume (A0)–(A2). Then for all ϕ,ϕ ∈ Φ, A−1B(ϕ,ϕ) is substochastic, (A−
B)
(
ϕ,ϕ
)
is a WDD L0-matrix and ĉon
[
A−1B
(
ϕ,ϕ
)] ≤ con[(A− B)(ϕ,ϕ)].
As previously mentioned, system (2.1.1) may have no solution. The matrix coefficients
introduced in this section allow us to algebraically characterize the existence of such solutions
through strategy-dependent linear systems of equations. For each strategy ϕ ∈ Φ, let O(ϕ) :
RG → RG be the operator that applies Id + L, M and H on the continuation, intervention
and opponent’s intervention regions, respectively. That is, O
(
ϕ
)
= Id − (A − B)(ϕ∗, ϕ∗) =(
Id−Ψ−SΨS)(Id+L) + ΨB(δ) +SΨB(δ)S. Then the following equivalences are immediate.
Proposition 2.4.5. Assume (A0)–(A2). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) v∗ solves the system of QVIs (2.1.1).
(ii) A
(
ϕ∗, ϕ∗
)
v∗ = B
(
ϕ∗
)
v∗ + C
(
ϕ∗, ϕ∗
)
.
(iii) v∗ = O
(
ϕ∗
)
v∗ + C
(
ϕ∗, ϕ∗
)
.
As mentioned in Remark 2.2.2, Assumption (A0) constrains the type of strategies the player
can use, but without taking into account the opponent’s response. This is enough for the single-
player constrained problems to have a solution and, therefore, for Algorithm 2.2.1 to be well
defined. But we cannot expect this restriction to be sufficient in the study of the two-player
game and the convergence of the overall routine.
In order to improve the result of Proposition 2.4.5 let us consider the following stronger
version of (A0) reflecting the interaction between the player and the opponent.
(A0’) For each pair of strategies ϕ,ϕ ∈ Φ, and for each x ∈ I ∪ (−I), there exists a walk in
graph(ΨB(δ) + SΨB(δ)S) from row x to some row y ∈ C ∩ C, where C = Ic, C = Ic.
Remark 2.4.6. (Interpretation) If ϕ,−ϕ are the strategies used by the player and the opponent
respectively,20 then (A0’) asserts that states in their intervention regions will eventually be
shifted to the common continuation region. This precludes infinite simultaneous interventions
and emulates the admissibility condition of the continuous-state case. Fixing I = ∅ we recover
(A0). Additionally, (A0’) together with (A1) imply that (A − B)(ϕ,ϕ) is WCDD, hence an
M -matrix, which is another one of the assumptions of the classical fixed-point policy iteration
[HFL12].
Under this new assumption, the ϕ∗ = ϕ∗(v∗)-dependent systems of Proposition 2.4.5 will
admit a unique solution. Then solving the original problem (2.1.1) amounts to finding v∗ ∈ RG
that solves its induced linear system of equations.
Proposition 2.4.7. Assume (A0’),(A1),(A2). In the context of Proposition 2.4.5, the following
statements are also equivalent:
(iv) v∗ = (A− B)−1C(ϕ∗, ϕ∗).
(v) v∗ = (Id−A−1B)−1A−1C(ϕ∗, ϕ∗) = ∑n≥0 (A−1B)nA−1C(ϕ∗, ϕ∗). (cf. equation (2.4.2).)
Proof. Both expressions result from rewriting and solving the systems of Proposition 2.4.5.
Assumptions (A0’),(A1) guarantee that (A − B)(ϕ∗, ϕ∗) is WCDD and, hence, nonsingular.
Then (v) is due to Lemma 2.4.4, Theorem A.1.6 and the matrix power series expansion (1 −
X)−1 =
∑
n≥0X
n, when ρ(X) < 1.
20The slight abuse of notation −ϕ stands for the strategy symmetric to ϕ, i.e., −ϕ = (−I,−δ(−x)).
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2.5 Convergence analysis
We now study the convergence properties of Algorithm 2.2.1. Henceforth, the UIP refers to
the obvious discrete analogue of Definition 1.2.1, where we replace the domain R, the impulse
constraint Z and the operator M by their discretizations G, Z and M respectively.
The obvious first question to address is whether when Algorithm 2.2.1 converges, it does so
to a solution of the system of QVIs (2.1.1). Unlike in the classical Bellman problem (2.1.4),
problem (2.1.1) is intrinsically dependent on the particular strategy chosen by the player (see
Propositions 2.4.5 and 2.4.7). Accordingly, we start with a lemma addressing what can be said
about the convergence of the strategies (ϕk) when the payoffs (vk) converge.
Notation 2.5.1. ∂I∗ := {Lv∗ + f = Mv∗ − v∗} ∩ G<0 denotes the ‘border’ of the intervention
region {Lv∗ + f ≤Mv∗ − v∗} ∩G<0 defined by v∗.
Lemma 2.5.2. Assume (A0)-(A2) and suppose vk → v∗. Then:
(i) ψk → ψ∗ in (∂I∗)c and Mvk →Mv∗.
(ii) If ψ, δ are any two limit points of (ψk), (δk) resp.,21 then
δ ∈ arg max
δ∈Z
{
B(δ)v∗ − c(δ)}, ψ = 0 in G>=0 and ψ ∈ arg max
i∈{0,1}
{
Oiv
∗} in G<0,
with O0v = Lv + f and O1v = Mv − v.
(iii) If v∗ has the UIP, then δk → δ∗(v∗) and Hvk → Hv∗.
Proof. That Mvk →Mv∗ is clear by continuity of the operators B(δ) and finiteness of Z.
Let x ∈ (∂I∗)c and suppose Lv∗(x)+f(x) < Mv∗(x)−v∗(x) (the other case being analogue).
By continuity of L and M there must exist some k0 such that Lv
k(x) + f(x) < Mvk(x)− vk(x)
for all k ≥ k0, which implies ψk(x) = 1 = ψ∗(x) for k ≥ k0.
The statement about ψ, δ is proved as before by considering appropriate subsequences.
Consequently, if v∗ has the UIP, then necessarily δk → δ∗(v∗) and Hvk → Hv∗.
As a corollary we can establish that, should the sequence (vk) converge, its limit must solve
problem (2.1.1). If convergence is not exact however (i.e., in finite iterations), then we will ask
that v∗ verifies some of the properties of the Verification Theorem in Corollary 1.3.9. Namely,
the UIP and a discrete analogue of the continuity in the border of the opponent’s intervention
region. We emphasise that our main motivation in solving system (2.1.1) relies in Corollary
1.3.9 and its framework. Additionally, in most practical situations and for fine-enough grids,
one can intuitively expect the discretization of an equilibrium payoff as in Corollary 2.1.1 to
inherit the UIP. Lastly, we note that the exact equality Lv∗ + f = Mv∗ − v∗ will typically not
be verified for any point in the grid in practice, giving ∂I∗ = ∅.
Corollary 2.5.3. Assume (A0)-(A2) and suppose vk → v∗. Then:
(i) If the convergence is exact, then v∗ solves the system of QVIs (2.1.1).
(ii) If v∗ has the UIP and Lv∗ + f = Hv∗ − v∗ on −∂I∗, then v∗ solves (2.1.1).
Proof. (i) is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.5.2 and Proposition 2.4.5.
In the general case, since {0, 1}G is finite, there is a subsequence of (ψk, ψk+1) that converges
to some pair (ψ,ψ). Passing to such subsequence, by Lemma 2.5.2, the UIP of v∗ and equation
(2.4.1), we get that v∗ solves the system A
(
ϕ,ϕ
)
v∗ = B
(
ϕ
)
v∗+C
(
ϕ,ϕ
)
for ϕ =
(
ψ, δ∗(v∗)
)
, ϕ =(
ψ, δ∗(v∗)
)
and ψ,ψ coincide with ψ∗ except possibly on ∂I∗. Thus, it only remains to show
that v∗ also solves the equations of the system (2.1.1) for any x ∈ ∂I∗ ∪ (−∂I∗).
21By ‘limit point’ we mean the limit of a convergent subsequence.
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For x ∈ ∂I∗, the previous is true by definition. Suppose now x ∈ −∂I∗ ⊆ Ic. We have
ψ∗(−x) = 1. If ψ(−x) = 1, there is nothing to prove. If ψ(−x) = 0, then x ∈ Ic ∩ (−I)c and
0 = Lv∗(x) + f(x) = Hv∗(x)− v∗(x), where the last equality holds true by assumption.
Lemma 2.5.2 shows to what extent the convergence of the payoffs imply the convergence
of the strategies. The following theorem, of theoretical interest, establishes a reciprocal under
the stronger assumption (A0’). In general, since the set of strategies Φ is finite, the sequence
of strategy-dependent coefficients of the fixed-point equations (2.4.1) will always be bounded
and with finitely many limit points. However, if the approximating strategies are such that
the former coefficients convergence, then Algorithm 2.2.1 is guaranteed to converge. Further,
instead of looking at the convergence of
(
A,B,C
)(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
, we can instead consider the weaker
condition of
(
A−1B,A−1C
)(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
converging.
Theorem 2.5.4. Assume (A0’),(A1),(A2). If
(
A−1B
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
))
and
(
A−1C
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
))
con-
verge, then (vk) converges.
Proof. Set b = limk A−1C
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
. Since Φ is finite, there must exist k0 ∈ N and ϕ,ϕ ∈ Φ
such that A−1B
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
= A−1B
(
ϕ,ϕ
)
and A−1C
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
= b for all k ≥ k0. Moreover,
under our assumptions, (A−B)(ϕ,ϕ) is WCDD. Then Lemma 2.4.4 and Theorem A.1.6 imply
that A−1B
(
ϕ,ϕ
)
is contractive for some matrix norm. Lastly, note that the sequence of pay-
offs (vk)k≥k0 now satisfies the classical (constant-coefficients) contractive fixed-point recurrence
vk+1 = A−1B
(
ϕ,ϕ
)
vk + b, which converges to the unique fixed-point of the equation.
The classical fixed-point policy-iteration framework [HFL12,Cli07] assumes uniform contrac-
tiveness in ‖ · ‖∞ of the sequence of operators. This is a natural norm to consider in a context
where matrices have properties defined row by row, such as diagonal dominance.22 However,
the authors mention convergence in experiments where only ‖ · ‖∞-non-expansiveness held true.
The latter is the typical case in our context, for the matrices A−1B
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
, which is why
Theorem 2.5.4 relies on the fact that a spectral radius strictly smaller than one guarantees
contractiveness in some matrix norm.
It is natural to ask whether there is some contractiveness condition that may account for
the observations in [HFL12, Cli07] and that can be generalized to our context to further the
study of Algorithm 2.2.1. Imposing a uniform bound on the spectral radii would not only be
hard to check, but also difficult to manipulate, as the spectral radius is not sub-multiplicative.23
Instead, we can consider the sequential indexes of contraction and connectivity, which naturally
generalize those of the previous section by means of walks in the graph of a sequence of matrices
(see Appendix A for more details). As before, they can be identified with one another (see
Lemma A.1.5) and, given substochastic matrices, the sequential index of contraction tells us
how many we need to multiply before the result becomes ‖ · ‖∞-contractive (Theorem A.1.7).
Thus, let us consider a uniform bound on the following sequential indexes of connectivity:
(A0”) There exists m ∈ N0 such that for any sequence of strategies (ϕk) ⊆ Φ,
con
[(
A− B)(ϕk, ϕk+1))
k
]
≤ m.
Remark 2.5.5. Given ϕ,ϕ ∈ Φ, by considering the sequence ϕ,ϕ, ϕ, ϕ, . . . , we see that (A0”)
implies (A0’). In fact, (A0”) can be interpreted as precluding infinite simultaneous impulses
even when the players can adapt their strategies (cf. Remark 2.4.6), and imposing that the
number of shifts needed for any state to reach the common continuation region is bounded.
Under this stronger assumption, we have:
22Recall that this norm can be computed as the maximum absolute value row sum.
23ρ(AB) ≤ ρ(A)ρ(B) does not hold in general when the matrices A and B do not commute.
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Proposition 2.5.6. Assume (A0”),(A1),(A2). Then (vk) is bounded.
Proof. In a similar way to Lemma 2.4.4, one can check that under (A0”),(A1),(A2) we have the
following uniform bound for the sequential indexes of contraction:
ĉon
[(
A−1B)
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
))
k
]
≤ m,
for any sequence of strategies (ϕk) ⊆ Φ. In other words, multiplying any m+ 1 of the previous
substochastic matrices results in a ‖.‖∞-contractive one. Furthermore, since Φm+1 is finite,
there must a be uniform uniform contraction constant C1 < 1. Let C2 > 0 be a uniform bound
for A−1C. By the representation in Corollary 2.4.2,
‖vk+1‖∞ ≤ ‖v0‖∞ + C2
k∑
n=0
C
[
k−n
m+1
]
1 ≤ ‖v0‖∞ + (m+ 1)C2
∞∑
n=0
Cn1 < +∞.24
Given n0 ∈ N and k > (m + 1)n0, the same argument of the previous proof shows that
one can decompose (vk) as vk+1 = uk + F (ϕk−(m+1)n0 , . . . , ϕk) + wk, for a fixed function F ,
‖uk‖∞ ≤ C [k/(m+1)]1 ‖v0‖ → 0 and ‖wk‖∞ ≤ (m + 1)C2
∑∞
n=n0
Cn1 . The latter is small if n0
is large. Hence, one could heuristically expect that the trailing strategies are often the ones
dominating the convergence of the algorithm. In fact, in all the experiments carried with a
discretization satisfying (A0”),(A1),(A2), a dichotomous behaviour was observed: the algorithm
either converged or at some point reached a cycle between a few payoffs. In the latter case, and
restricting attention to instances in which one heuristically expects a solution to exist (more
details in Section 3), it was possible to reduce the residual to the QVIs and the distance between
the iterates by refining the grid.
The previous motivates the study of Algorithm 2.2.1 when the grid is sequentially refined,
instead of fixed. Such an analysis however, would likely entail the need of a viscosity solutions
framework as in [ABL18,BS91], which does not currently exist in the literature of nonzero-sum
stochastic impulse games. Consequently, this analysis and the stronger convergence results that
may come out of it are inevitably outside the scope of this paper.
2.6 Discretization schemes
Let us conclude this section by showing how one can discretize the symmetric system of QVIs
(1.3.1) to obtain (2.1.1) in a way that satisfies the assumptions present throughout the paper.
Recall that we work on a given symmetric grid G : x−N = −xN < · · · < x−1 = −x1 < x0 =
0 < x1 < · · · < xN .
Firstly, we want a discretization L of the operator A − ρId such that −L is an SDD L0-
matrix as per (A1). A standard way to do this is to approximate the first (resp. second)
order derivatives with forward and backward (resp. central) differences in such a way that we
approximate the ordinary differential equation (ODE) 12σ
2V ′′ + µV ′ − ρV + f = 0 with an
upwind (or positive-coefficients) scheme. More precisely, for each x = xi ∈ G we approximate
the first derivative with a forward (resp. backward) difference if its coefficient in the previous
equation is nonegative (resp. negative) in xi,
V ′(xi) ≈ V (xi+1)− V (xi)
xi+1 − xi if µ(xi) ≥ 0 and V
′(xi) ≈ V (xi)− V (xi+1)
xi − xi+1 if µ(xi) < 0
24For any x ∈ R, [x] denotes its integer part.
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and the second derivative by
V ′′(xi) ≈ V (xi+1)− V (xi)
(xi+1 − xi)(xi+1 − xi−1) −
V (xi)− V (xi−1)
(xi − xi−1)(xi+1 − xi−1) .
In the case of an equispaced grid with step size h, this reduces to
V ′(x) ≈ V
(
x+ sgn(µ(x))h
)− V (x)
sgn(µ(x))h
and V ′′(x) ≈ V (x+ h)− 2V (x) + V (x− h)
h2
.25
For the previous stencils to be defined in the extreme points of the grid, we consider two ad-
ditional points x−N−1, xN+1 and replace V (x−N−1), V (xN+1) in the previous formulas by some
values resulting from artificial boundary conditions. A common choice is to impose Neumann
conditions to solve for V (x−N−1), V (xN+1) using the first order differences from before. For
example, in the equispaced grid case, given LBC,RBC ∈ R we solve for V (x−N − h) (resp.
V (xN + h)) from the Neumann condition
LBC1 = V
′
(
x−N − h1{µ(x−N )≥0}
)
(resp. RBC = V ′
(
xN + h1{µ(xN )<0}
)
),
yielding V (x−N − h) = V (x−N ) − BC1h (resp. V (xN + h) = V (xN ) + BC2h). The choice of
LBC,RBC is problem-specific and intrinsically linked to that of xN , although it does not affect
the properties of the discrete operators. See more details in Section 3. The described procedure
leads to a discretization of the ODE as Lv+ f = 0, with L satisfying the properties we wanted.
(The strict diagonal dominance is a consequence of ρ > 0.) Note that the values of f at x−N , xN
need to be modified to account for the boundary conditions.
Remark 2.6.1. One could increase the overall order of approximation by using central differences
as much as possible for the first order derivatives, provided the scheme remains upwind (see
[FL07,WF08] for more details). This is not done here in order to simplify the presentation.
We now approximate the impulse constraint sets Z(x) (x ∈ R) by finite sets ∅ 6= Z(x) ⊆
[0,+∞) (x ∈ G), such that Z(x) = {0} if x ≥ 0, and define the impulse operators
B(δ)v(x) = v[[x+ δ(x)]], for v ∈ RG, δ ∈ Z, x ∈ G,
where v[[y]] denotes linear interpolation of v on y using the closest nodes on the grid, and
v[[y]] = v(x±N ) if ±y > ±x±N (i.e., ‘no extrapolation’). This univocally defines the discrete
loss and gain operators M and H as per (2.1.2), as well as the optimal impulse δ∗ according to
(2.1.3). The set of discrete strategies Φ is defined as in (2.2.1).
This general discretization scheme satisfies assumptions (A0)–(A2) and one can impose some
regularity conditions on the sets Z(x) and Z(x) such that the solutions of the discrete QVI
problems (2.2.2) converge locally uniformly to the unique viscosity solution of the analytical
impulse control problem, as the grid is refined.26 See [Azi17,ABL18] for more details.
Example 2.6.2. In the case where Z(x) = [0,+∞) for x < 0, a natural and most simple choice
for Z(x) is Z(xi) = {0, xi+1 − xi, . . . , xN − xi} for i < 0. In this case, B(δ)v(x) = v(x + δ(x))
and Hv(x) = v(x− δ∗(−x)) + g(x,−δ∗(−x)). This choice, however, does not satisfy (A0’).
In order to preclude infinite simultaneous interventions it is enough to constrain the size of
the impulses so that the symmetric point of the grid cannot be reached. That is, Z(x) ⊆ [0,−2x)
for any x ∈ G<0. In this case, the scheme satisfies the stronger conditions (A0”),(A1),(A2) (and
in particular, (A0’)). Note that we can take m = N in (A0”), as each positive impulse will lead
to a state which is at least one node closer to x0 = 0, where no player intervenes. Practically,
it makes sense to make this choice when one suspects (or wants to check whether) there is a
symmetric NE with no ‘far-reaching impulses’, in the previous sense.
25sgn denotes the sign function, sgn(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and −1 otherwise.
26Additional technical conditions include costs bounded away from zero and a comparison principle for the for
the analytical QVI.
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Example 2.6.3. If Z(x) = [0,+∞) for x < 0, the analogous of Example 2.6.2 is now Z(xi) =
{0, xi+1 − xi, . . . , x−i−1 − xi} for i < 0.
Remark 2.6.4. Consider Example 2.6.3 in the context of Remark 2.1.1. As in Proposition 2.5.6
and due to Theorem A.1.7, the less impulses needed between the two players to reach the
common continuation region, the faster that the composition of the fixed-point operators of Al-
gorithm 2.2.1 becomes contractive. Hence, one could intuitively expect that when close enough
to the solution, the choice of the maximum arg-maximum in (2.1.3) improves the performance
of Algorithm 2.2.1. This is another motivation for such choice.
3 Numerical results
This section presents numerical results obtained on a series of experiments. See Introduction
and Section 1.3 for the motivation and applications behind some of them. We do not assume
a priori constraints on the impulses in the analytical problem. All the results presented were
obtained on equispaced grids with step size h > 0 (to be specified) and with a discretization
scheme as in Section 2.6 and Example 2.6.3. The extreme points of the grid are displayed on
each graph.
For the games with linear costs and gains of the form c(x, δ) = c0+c1δ and g(x, δ) = g0+g1δ,
with c0, c1, g0, g1 constant, the artificial boundary conditions were taken as LBC = c1 and RBC
= g1 for a sufficiently extensive grid. They result from the observation that on a hypothetical
symmetric NE of the form ϕ∗ =
(
(−∞, x], δ∗(x) = y∗ − x), with x < 0, x < y∗ ∈ R, the
equilibrium payoff verifies V (x) = V (y∗) − c0 − c1(y∗ − x) for x < x and V (x) = V (−y∗) +
g0 + g1(x+ y∗) for x > −x. For other examples, LBC, RBC and the grid extension were chosen
by heuristic guesses and/or trial and error. However, in all the examples presented the error
propagation from poorly chosen LBC,RBC was minimal.
The initial guess was set as v0 = 0 and its induced strategy in all cases. SolveImpulseC-
ontrol was chosen as Subroutine 2.3.1 with t˜ol = 10−15 and λ = 1.27 Its convergence was
exact however, in all the examples, and faster (in terms of time elapsed and number of opera-
tions) when it was compared with Howard’s policy iteration (not reported). Instead of fixing
a terminal tolerance tol beforehand, we display the highest accuracy that was attained in each
case and the number of iterations needed for it.
Section 3.1 considers a fixed grid and and games where the results point to the existence
of a symmetric NE as per Corollary 1.3.9. Not having an analytical solution to compare with,
results are assessed by means of the percentage difference between the iterations
Diff :=
∥∥∥(vk+1 − vk)/max{|vk+1|, scale}∥∥∥
∞
,
with scale = 1 as in [AF16], and the maximum pointwise residual to the system of QVIs (2.1.1),
defined for v ∈ RG by setting I = {Lv + f ≤Mv − v} ∩G<0, C = Ic and
maxResQVIs(v) :=
∥∥max{Lv + f,Mv − v}1−C + (Hv − v)1−I∥∥∞ .
Section 3.2 considers the only symmetric games in the literature with (semi-) analytical solution:
the central bank linear game [ABC+19] and the cash management game [BCG19], and computes
the errors made by discrete approximations, showing in particular the effect of refining the grid.
Not considered here is the strategic pollution control game [FK19], due to its inherent non-
symmetric nature. Section 3.3 comments on results obtained for games without NEs. Finally,
Section 3.4 shows results that go beyond the scope of the currently available theory for impulse
games.
27For very fine grids, one should increase the value of t˜ol to avoid stagnation as per Remark 2.2.4, and the
same being true for Subroutine 2.3.1.
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3.1 Convergence to discrete solution on a fixed grid
Throughout this section the grid step size is fixed as h = .01, unless otherwise stated (although
results where corroborated by further refinements). Each figure specifies the structure, G =
(µ, σ, ρ, f, c, g), of the symmetric game solved and shows the numerical solutions at the terminal
iteration for the equilibrium payoff, vk, and NE. Graphs plot payoff versus state of the process.
The intervention region is displayed in red over the graph of the payoff for presentation purposes.
As a general rule, we focus on games with higher costs c than gains g, as the opposite
typically leads to players attempting to apply infinite simultaneous impulses [ABC+19] (i.e.,
inducing a gain from the opponent’s intervention is ‘cheap’) leading to degenerate games. The
following games resulted in exact convergence in finite iterations, which guarantees a solution
of (2.1.1) was reached (Corollary 2.5.3), although very small acceptable errors where reached
much sooner.
The following is an example in which the accuracy stagnates. At that point, the iterates start
going back and forth between a few values. Although we cannot guarantee that we are close to a
solution of (2.1.1), the results seem quite convincing, with both Diff and maxResQVIs reasonably
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low. In fact, simply halving the step size to h = .005 produces a substantial improvement of
Diff=9.16e-11% and maxResQVIs=9.19e-11 in k =33 iterations.
The previous games have a state variable evolving as a scaled Brownian motion. We now
move on to a mean reverting OU process with zero long term mean. (Recall that any other value
an be handled simply by shifting the game.) In general, the experiments with this dynamics
converged exactly in a very small number of iterations.
Note how all the games treated in this section exhibit a typical feature known to hold for
simpler symmetric games [ABC+19, ABM+19, BCG19]: the equilibrium payoff of the player is
only C1 at the border of the intervention region ∂I∗ = {AV − ρV + f =MV − V } ∩R<0, and
only continuous at the border of the opponent’s intervention region −∂I∗. In floating point
arithmetic, the former makes the discrete approximation of ∂I∗ particularly elusive, while the
latter can lead to high errors when close to −∂I∗. As a consequence, Subroutine 2.3.1 (or any
equivalent) will often misplace a few grid nodes between intervention and continuation regions,
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which will in turn make the residual resQVIs ‘spike’ on the opponent’s side. Thus, a large value
of maxResQVIs can at times be misleading, and further inspection of the pointwise residuals is
advisable.
As a matter of fact, halving the step size to h = .005 in the last example results in exact
convergence with terminal maxResQVIs= 2510, but the residual on all grid nodes other than
the ‘border’ of the opponent’s intervention region and a contiguous one is less than 1.43e-11.
This is an extreme example propitiated by the almost vertical shape of the solution close to
such border. Thus, while it is useful in practice to consider a stopping criteria for Algorithm
2.2.1 based on maxResQVIs, this phenomenon needs to be minded.
The last example also shows how impulses at a NE can lead to different endpoints depending
on the state of the process. This is often the case when costs are nonlinear. In fact:
Lemma 3.1.1. Let (I∗, δ∗) and V be a symmetric NE and equilibrium payoff as in Corollary
1.3.9. Suppose Z(x) = [0,+∞) for x < 0 and c = c(x, δ) ∈ C2(R× (0,+∞)), and consider the
re-parametrization c = c(x, y) := c(x, y − x). Suppose that y∗ := x + δ∗(x) is constant for all
x ∈ (I∗)◦.28 Then cxy(x, y∗) ≡ 0 on (I∗)◦.
The result is immediate sinceMV (x) = supy>x{V (y)− c(x, y)} = V (y∗)− c(x, y∗) on (I∗)◦
and V ∈ C1( − C∗). (y∗ /∈ −I∗ or there would be infinite simultaneous impulses.) While the
sufficient condition cxy(x, y
∗) ≡ 0 for some y∗ is verified for linear costs, it is not in general and
certainly not for c(x, δ) = 10 + 20
√
δ as in the last example.
3.2 Convergence to analytical solution with refining grids
A convergence analysis from discrete to analytical solution with refining grids is outside the
scope of this paper, and seems to be far too challenging when a viscosity solutions framework
is yet to be developed. Instead, we present here a numerical validation using the solutions of
the linear and cash management games. We focus first and foremost in the former, as it has an
almost fully analytical solution, with only one parameter to be found numerically as opposed to
four for the latter. The structure of the game is defined with parameter values used in [ABC+19]
(also in [ABM+19]). To minimize rounding errors from floating point arithmetic, we proceed
as in [AF16] considering grids made up entirely of machine numbers. The results are displayed
in Table 1.
For each step size, Algorithm 2.2.1 either converged or was terminated upon stagnation.
Regardless, we can see the errors when approximating the analytical solution are quite satisfac-
tory in all cases, and overall decrease as h→ 0. Moreover, we see once again how the ‘spiking’
of the residual can be misleading (the highest value was always at the ‘border’ of the opponent’s
intervention region).
h %error Its. maxResQVIs
1 6.67% 17 8.88e-16
1/2 8.33% 13 5.33e-15
1/4 0.23% 4 13.2
1/8 0.21% 8 15.1
1/16 0.16% 8 30
1/32 0.07% 21 21.2
1/64 0.0043% 37 0.343
Table 1: Convergence to analytical so-
lution when refining equispaced sym-
metric grid with step size h and end-
point xN = 4. Game: µ = 0, σ =
.15, ρ = .02, f = x + 3, c = 100 +
15δ, g = 15δ. %error := ‖(v−V )/V ‖∞,
with V exact solution and v discrete ap-
proximation after Its iterations. ‖ · ‖∞
is computed over the grid.
The exact NE of this game (up to five significant figures) is given by the intervention region
I∗ = (−∞,−2.8238] and impulse function δ∗(x) = 1.5243 − x, while the approximation given
28A◦ denotes the interior of the set A ⊆ R.
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by Algorithm 2.2.1with h = 1/64 is
(
(−∞,−2.8125], 1.5313 − x), with absolute errors on the
parameters of no more than the step size.
The cash management game [BCG19] with unidirectional impulses can be embedded in our
framework by reducing its dimension with the change of variables x = x1 − x2, changing mini-
mization by maximization and relabelling the players. With the parameter values of [BCG19,
Fig.1b], it translates into the game: µ = 0, σ = 1, ρ = .5, f = −|x|, c = 3 + δ, g = −1. The
authors found numerically a symmetric NE approximately equal to
(
(−∞,−5.658], 0.686− x),
while Algorithm 2.2.1 with xN = 8 and h = 1/64 gives
(
(−∞,−5.6563], 0.6875 − x). The
absolute difference on the parameters is once again below the grid step size.
3.3 Games without Nash equilibria
It is natural to ask how does Algorithm 2.2.1 behave on games without symmetric NEs, and
whether anything can be inferred from the results. For the linear game, two cases without
NEs (symmetric or not) are addressed in [ABC+19]: ‘no fixed cost’ and ‘gain greater than
cost’. Both of them yield degenerate ‘equilibria’ where the players perform infinite simultaneous
interventions. When tested for several parameters, Algorithm 2.2.1 converged in finitely many
iterations (although rather slowly) and yielded the exact same type of ‘equilibria’.29 For a
fine enough grid, the latter can be identified heuristically by some node in the intervention
region that would be shifted to its symmetric one (infinite alternated interventions), or to its
immediate successor over and over again, until reaching the continuation region (infinite one-
sided interventions).30
In the first case, we recovered the limit ‘equilibrium payoffs’ of [ABC+19, Props.4.10,4.11].
Intuitively, the players in this game take advantage of free interventions, whether by no cost
or perfect compensation, in order to shift the process as desired. Note that when c = g, the
impulses that maximimize the net payoff are not unique.
In the second case, grid refinements showed the discrete payoffs to diverge towards infinity
at every point. This is again consistent with the theory: each player forces the other one to
act, producing a positive instantaneous profit. Iterating this procedure infinitely often leads to
infinite payoffs for every state.
Tested games in which Algorithm 2.2.1 failed to converge (and not due to stagnation nor
a poor choice of the grid extension) were characterized by iterates reaching a cycle, typically
with high values of Diff and maxResQVIs regardless of the grid step size. In many cases, the
cycles would visit at least one payoff inducing infinite simultaneous impulses. While this might,
potentially and heuristically, be indicative of the game admitting no symmetric NE, there is
not much more than can be said at this stage.
3.4 Beyond the Verification Theorem
We now present two cases in which the solution of the discrete QVIs system (2.1.1) found with
Algorithm 2.2.1 (by exact convergence) does not comply with the continuity and smoothness
assumptions of Corollary 1.3.9. However, the results are sensible enough to heuristically argue
they may correspond to NEs beyond the scope of the Verification Theorem. In both cases
h = .01. Finer grids yielded the qualitative same results.
The first one considers costs convex in the impulse. When far enough from her continuation
region, it is cheaper for the player to apply several (finitely many) simultaneous impulses instead
of one, to reach the state she wishes to (cf. Remark 1.2.4). In this game, the optimal impulse δ∗
becomes discontinuous, and its discontinuity points are those in the intervention region where
29There were also cases of stagnation, improved by refining the grid as in Section 3.1.
30More precisely, due to our choice of Z(x) a node can be shifted at most to that immediately preceding its
symmetric one.
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the equilibrium payoff is non-differentiable. These, in turn, translate into discontinuities on the
opponent’s intervention region (one smoothness degree less, as with the border of the regions).
The second one considers linear gains, quadratic running payoffs and costs concave on the
impulse. The latter makes the player shift the process towards her continuation region (cf.
Remark 1.2.4). However, when far enough from the border, instead of shifting the process
directly to her ‘preferred area’, the player chooses to pay a bit more to force her opponent’s
intervention, inducing a gain and letting the latter pay for the final move. Once again, this
causes δ∗ to be discontinuous and leads to a non-differentiable (resp. discontinuous) point for
the equilibrium payoff in the intervention (resp. opponent’s intervention) region.
Under the previous reasoning, one could intuitively guess that setting g = 0 in this game
should remove the main incentive the player has to force her opponent to act. This is in fact
the case, as shown below. As a result, δ∗ is continuous and the resulting equilibrium payoff falls
back into the domain of the Verification Theorem.
We remark that, should the previous solutions correspond indeed to NEs, then the alterna-
tive semi-analytical approach of [FK19] could not have produced them either, as the latter can
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only yield continuous equilibrium payoffs.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper presents a fixed-point policy-iteration-type algorithm to solve systems of quasi-
variational resulting from a Verification Theorem for symmetric nonzero-sum stochastic impulse
games. In this context, the method substantially improves the only algorithm available in the
literature while providing the convergence analysis that we were missing. Graph-theoretic as-
sumptions relating to weakly chained diagonally dominant matrices, which naturally parallel
the admissibility of the players strategies, allow to prove properties of contractiveness, bound-
edness of iterates and convergence to solutions. A result of theoretical interest giving sufficient
conditions for convergence is also proved. Equilibrium payoffs and Nash equilibria of games
too challenging for the available analytical approaches are computed with high precision on
a discrete setting. Numerical validation with analytical solutions is performed when possible,
with reassuring results, but it is noted that grid refinements may be needed at times to over-
come stagnation. Thus, formalising the approximating properties of the discrete solutions as
well as deriving stronger convergence results for the algorithm may need a viscosity solutions
framework currently missing in the theory. This is further substantiated by the irregularity
of the solutions, particularly those found which escape the available theoretical results. This
motivates further research while providing a tool that can effectively be used to gain insight
into these very challenging problems.
A Matrix and graph theoretic definitions and results
For the reader’s convenience, this appendix summarizes some important algebraic and graph
theoretic definitions and results used throughout the paper. More details can be found in the
references given below. Henceforth, A ∈ RN×N is a real matrix, Id ∈ RN×N is the identity, ρ(·)
denotes the spectral radius and RN ,RN×N are equipped with the elementwise order. We talk
about rows and ‘states’ interchangeably.
Definitions A.1.1. (D1) A is a Z-matrix if it has nonpositive off-diagonal elements.
(D2) A is an L-matrix (resp. L0-matrix ) if it is a Z-matrix with positive (resp. nonnegative)
diagonal elements.
(D3) A is an M -matrix if A = sId−B for some matrix B ≥ 0 and scalar s ≥ ρ(B).
(D4) A is monotone if it is nonsingular and A−1 ≥ 0. Equivalently, A is monotone if Ax ≥ 0
implies x ≥ 0 for any x ∈ RN .
(D5) The i-th row of A is weakly diagonally dominant (WDD) (resp. strictly diagonally domi-
nant or SDD) if |Aii| ≥
∑
j 6=i |Aij | (resp. >).
(D6) A is WDD (resp. SDD) if every row of A is WDD (resp. SDD).
(D7) The directed graph of A is the pair graphA := (V,E), where V := {1, . . . , N} is the set of
vertexes and E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges, such that (i, j) ∈ E iff Aij 6= 0.
(D8) A walk p in graphA = (V,E) from vertex i to vertex j is a nonempty finite sequence
(i, i1), (i1, i2), . . . , (ik−1, j) ⊆ E, which we denote by i→ i1 → · · · → ik−1 → j. |p| := k is
called the length of the walk p.
(D9) A is weakly chained diagonally dominant (WCDD) if it is WDD and for each WDD row
of A there is a walk in graphA to an SDD row (identifying vertexes and rows).
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(D10) A is (right) substochastic or sub-Markov (resp. stochastic or Markov) if A ≥ 0 and each
row sums at most one (resp. exactly one). Equivalently, A is substochastic if A ≥ 0 and
‖A‖∞ ≤ 1. (Recall that ‖A‖∞ is the maximum row-sum of absolute values.)
(D11) If A is a WDD (resp. substochastic) matrix, its set of ‘non-trouble states’ (or rows) is
J [A] := {i : the i-th row of A is SDD} (resp. Jˆ [A] := {i : ∑j Aij < 1}). For each i, we
write Pi[A] := {walks in graphA from i to some j ∈ J [A]} (resp. analogously for Pˆi[A]).
The index of connectivity (resp. index of contraction) of A [Azi19a] is
conA :=
 sup
i/∈J(A)
{
inf
p∈Pi(A)
|p|
}+ (resp. analogously for ĉonA).31
It is clear that SDD =⇒WCDD =⇒WDD, and by definition, L-matrix =⇒ L0-matrix =⇒
Z-matrix. Also by definition, if A is WDD, then A is WCDD ⇐⇒ conA < +∞.
Proposition A.1.2. (e.g., [AF16, Lem.3.2]) Any WCDD matrix is nonsingular.
Proposition A.1.3. (e.g., [Azi19a, Prop.2.15 and 2.17])
Nonsingular M-matrix ⇐⇒ monotone L-matrix ⇐⇒ monotone Z-matrix.
Theorem A.1.4. (e.g., [Azi19a, Thm.2.24]) WCDD L0-matrix ⇐⇒ WDD nonsingular M-
matrix.32
Proposition A.1.5. (see proof of [Azi19a, Lem.2.22]) A is substochastic if and only if Id−A
is a WDD L0-matrix and A has non-negative diagonal elements. In such case, Jˆ [A] = J [Id−A],
they have the same directed graphs (except possibly for self-loops i→ i) and ĉonA = con[Id−A].
For the following theorem, recall the characterization of the spectral radius ρ(A) = inf{‖A‖ :
‖ · ‖ is a matrix norm} and Gelfand’s formula ρ(A) = limn→+∞ ‖An‖1/n, for any matrix norm
‖ · ‖. Note also that if A is substochastic, then An is also substochastic for any n ∈ N0,
‖An‖∞ ≤ 1 and ρ(A) ≤ 1.
Theorem A.1.6. ( [Azi19a, Thm.2.5 and Cor.2.6]) Suppose A is substochastic. Then
ĉonA = inf{n ∈ N0 : ‖An+1‖∞ < 1}.
In particular, ĉonA < +∞ if and only if ρ(A) < 1.
The indexes of contraction and connectivity can be generalized in a natural way to sequences
(Ak) ⊆ RN×N by considering walks i1 → i2 → . . . such that ik → ik+1 is an edge in graphAk
(see [Azi19a, App.B] for more details). Theorem A.1.6 extends in the following way:
Theorem A.1.7. ( [Azi19a, Thm.B.2]) Suppose (Ak) are substochastic matrices and consider
the sequence of products (Bk), where Bk := A1 . . . Ak. Then,
ĉon
[
(Ak)k
]
= inf{k ∈ N0 : ‖Bk+1‖∞ < 1}.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.4. For briefness, we omit the dependence on ϕ,ϕ from the notation.
A−1B ≥ 0 since B ≥ 0 and A is monotone. To see that its rows sum up to one, let 1 ∈ RG
be the vector of ones. It is easy to check that under (A1)–(A2), AA−1B1 = B1 ≤ A1, which
implies A−1B1 ≤ 1. The WDD L0-property of A− B is due to (A1).
31(·)+ denotes positive part, inf ∅ = +∞ and sup ∅ = −∞. The index is the least length that needs to be
walked on graphA to reach the non-trouble states when starting from an arbitrary trouble one.
32 [Azi19a, Thm.2.24] is formulated in terms of L-matrices instead. However, it is trivial to see that: WCDD
L0-matrix ⇐⇒ WCDD L-matrix.
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Note that by Proposition A.1.5, we can consider A−1B and Id − A−1B interchangeably.
Let us show that J
[
(A − B)(ϕ,ϕ)] ⊆ Jˆ[A−1B(ϕ,ϕ)]. By monotonicity and L0-property, A−1
must have strictly positive diagonal elements. Indeed, if there was some index i such that
A−1ii = 0, then 1 = [AA−1]ii =
∑
j 6=iAijA
−1
ji ≤ 0. Consider now some xi ∈ Jˆ
[
A−1B
]c
, i.e.,∑
j [A−1B]ij = 1. We want to see that
∑
j [A − B]ij = 0. We have 0 =
∑
j
[
Id − A−1B]
ij
=∑
j
[
A−1(A−B)]
ij
=
∑
k A
−1
ik
∑
j
[
A−B]
kj
. Since A−1ik and
∑
j
[
A−B]
kj
are non-negative for
all k, one of the two must be zero for each k. But A−1ii > 0, giving what we wanted.
The final conclusion follows from the previous properties and the fact that A(Id−A−1B) =
A− B.
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